In his philosophical work the Republic, Plato hypothesizes through the literary portrait of his mentor, Socrates, that art is “an imitation of an illusion” (598b5). The character Socrates argues that art is not only an imitation of the object it portrays, but also an imitation of the mere appearance of that object. He posits in the chapter “Art in Kallipolis” that an “imitation is an inferior thing that consorts with another inferior thing to produce inferior offspring” (603b). Socrates means that a painting is the product of imitating the image of the object that the painting portrays. To illustrate his theory, Socrates places an artist who makes a painting in contrast with a carpenter who builds a couch. He states that unlike an artist, a carpenter is a craftsman whose product is only one place removed from its original, ideal form. In other words, a couch built by a carpenter is an imitation of the original form, while the artist’s painting of a couch is an imitation of an imitation. In the same chapter, Socrates’ fictional companion Glaucon agrees, stating that a painter “is an imitator of what the others are craftsmen of” (597e). Are Socrates and Glaucon correct? Is a painter merely an imitator of other craftsmen? Or does a painter produce an imitation of an entirely unique and original form: a painting?
In the chapter “Art in Kallipolis,” Socrates proposes that the intent of painters and carpenters is the same. He states, “So painter, carpenter, and god—these three oversee three kinds of couches?” (597b10). Socrates suggests that a painter and carpenter each desire to oversee the creation of a type of couch. He says that while we should certainly call a carpenter the maker of a couch, “should we call a painter, too, a craftsman and maker of such a thing?” (597d9-12). Socrates believes that a painter fails to be the creator of a couch. But if I was Socrates’ student, I would ask, can one fail at what he does not attempt? Perhaps a painter who paints a couch does not try to imitate the form of a couch, but instead is seeking to mimic the form of a painting. And maybe in his endeavor to create an imitation of a painting, he does succeed. Therefore, if the artist, who makes a painting of a couch, has an entirely different goal from that of a carpenter, who builds an actual couch, can the carpenter’s work be said to be more valuable than the artist’s?
Plato writes through Socrates’ friend Glaucon that the occupation and product of a painter is of less value than that of a carpenter. Glaucon states that “these things certainly are not equal in honor or benefit” (599b10). Glaucon is implying that the creation of art and the creation of useful objects or ideas are not of the same value. Socrates agrees with Glaucon, saying, “Do you think, then that if someone could make both what is imitated and its image, he would allow himself to take making images seriously, and put it at the forefront of his life as the best ability he had?” (599a6). Socrates believes that no one would be satisfied with making a painting of a couch if he could build an actual couch. He implies further that the only reason for one to paint a couch is because he is incapable of building one. But is it possible that the artist could see more value in his painting of a couch than in a functional couch that he might build? I would ask if the purpose of a couch—to be sat upon—is more valuable than the purpose of a painting of a couch, which is to be admired and to provoke ideas and thoughts? Maybe the two crafts are nonequivalent because of the inherent difference in the intent of their creators. Therefore, a painting of a couch may not be, as Socrates implies, “inferior” to an actual couch if a painting truly has its own, ideal form?
Socrates believes that a painting consists only in imitation, lacking an ideal form of its own. He states firmly in “Art in Kallipolis” that a painting is simply “an imitation of an illusion” (598b5). Socrates argues that painters create nothing on their own and only imitate the crafts that others have created. He further states that “painting—and imitation as a whole—are far from the truth” (603a10). This statement may certainly be true, but is painting mere imitation, or does it have its own form? Plato illustrates many different ways that we can come to the conclusion that a higher being created all the forms that humans can conceive. Glaucon agrees with this belief when he says, “Since it is by nature he [the god] has made it and all others [all other forms]” (597d5). A greater being, or “god,” has preemptively created anything we can possibly imagine. Therefore, the reason that we can build a boat or a plane or a couch is because a higher being first created the forms of these objects. If this belief is true, then I would argue that if humans can conceive of and then create a painting, then it must follow that the “god” who created all forms must have also created first the form of a painting. Therefore, a painting must, as all things do, have its own unique form, or people would not be able to conceive of a painting.
So does Plato’s character Socrates know the true value of art? Socrates asks in the Republic, “At what does painting aim?” (598b). Maybe we can gather from his question that Socrates is not sure what intent a painter has when he puts brush to canvas. Socrates states that the goal of a painter is to deceive others. He says of a painter, “by painting a carpenter and displaying him at a distance, he might deceive children and adults into thinking it truly is a carpenter” (598c5). But when artists paint, do they really intend to deceive others through their art? Artist Jerzy Kosinski said, “The principle of true art is not to portray, but to evoke.” I think most painters create their art not to deceive or to recreate things exactly as they appear in real life, but to express and to communicate their ideas and emotions. Take, for example, the painting entitled The Death of Socrates by Jacques-Louis David. Is David trying to copy exactly what Socrates looked like at the time he was executed, or is David trying to show us an even greater truth: the nobility of Socrates—a man who would give his life for the truth? Perhaps—unlike Plato posits through Socrates in the Republic—the intent of an artist is not comparable to the intent of a carpenter, and an artist’s work is not less valuable than a carpenter’s work. Maybe a painting is not at all an imitation of what it depicts, but is an imitation of its own ideal form. Perhaps Plato’s caricature of Socrates would have viewed the art of painting differently if Plato had ever used the medium of paint to communicate his ideas, rather than the medium of words. Plato’s art was philosophy, and he wrote many profound works, but perhaps a venture into the world of art would led him to even more discoveries.
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